Islam and anticolonial rebellions in north and west Africa, 1914-1918 by Krause, Jonathan
1 
 
Islam and Anticolonial Rebellions in North and West Africa, 
1914-1918 
Jonathan Krause 
University of Wolverhampton 
 
Abstract: European empires experienced widespread anticolonial rebellions during the First 
World War.  These rebellions occurred for many different reasons, reflecting the diversity of 
context and history across colonial societies in Africa and Asia.  Religion naturally played a 
strong role in most of the anticolonial rebellions during the First World War, most prominently 
Islam.  This article looks at the role Islam played in two key anticolonial rebellions in North and 
West Africa: the rebellions in Batna, Algeria and the Kaocen War in Niger, respectively.  The 
article examines how Islam was instrumentalized by rebels, imperial collaborators, and French 
officers and administrators to further their own ends.  Rebels called upon Islam to help inspire 
anticolonial movements, to bind together diverse populations, and to contextualise their actions 
in wider socio-political conflicts.  Imperial collaborators likewise called on religious authority to 
assist with European imperial recruitment efforts.  French officers and administrators used Islam 
both as a justification and a target for collective punishment and repression after the rebellions 
were put down from 1917.  This repression is still under-studied in a period usually portrayed as 
evidencing broad imperial harmony, rather than violent extraction and oppression. 
 
 
‘There is no god but god – Mohammed is the prophet of god.  The hearts of [our] enemies are 
separated [from god] due to their misdeeds.  They make no distinction between the true and the 
false.  If god gives you victory, no one will conquer you.  How many small bands of men have 
overtaken large groups with the aid of God?  God is with the patient.’1  This was the (rather 
lengthy) message written on the great black standard of Kaocen ben Mohammed, a Tuareg leader 
who besieged Agadez, Niger for some 80 days from December 1916 to March 1917.  While the 
siege was eventually broken by a French-led relief force arriving from Dakar, by way of Lagos 
and Kano, fighting continued in the Aïr for another four years, blooming into what is now called 
the Kaocen War.  This would be the most significant and prolonged anticolonial war in Nigerien 
history, with some arguing that it laid the ground for later Nigerien nationalism.2  The Kaocen 
War, and the larger Senussi War that it was a component part of, was just one of the many 
anticolonial struggles that wracked the French empire during the First World War.   
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 Nearly every major French colony in Africa and Asia experienced some notable 
anticolonial rebellion during the course of the First World War.  This wildfire of rebellion hit its 
peak in 1916 with major anticolonial fighting occurring in Algeria, Burkina Faso, Mali, Niger, 
Chad, and Benin.3  The size, scope, nature, and consequences of these rebellions as a global 
phenomenon have not yet been seriously addressed in the historiography of the First World War, 
despite their number, diversity and local importance.4  These rebellions erupted for many 
complex reasons reflecting the widely varying histories, societies and contexts from which they 
sprung, even if they were all ultimately tied to the realities brought forth by the First World War.  
This diversity of context and expression includes a wide range of both personal and institutional 
religious responses.  These responses, and the religious traditions which informed them, were as 
varied as the people who fought against French colonialism.   
 Of the many religious traditions that existed in European overseas empires in the early 
20th century none caused more concern for the French (and Europeans more broadly) than 
Islam.5   For French colonial officials Islam represented a foreign ‘non-African’ religion whose 
spread among black Africans was to be closely tracked, and at times feared.6  In reality, of 
course, the history of Islam in Africa is ancient.  North Africa was progressively conquered by 
Islamic forces from the mid-7th century, shortly after the death of Mohammed.  Contact between 
Muslim North Africans and non-Muslim Sub-Saharan Africans began almost immediately, with 
North Africans seeking West African gold from as early as 734.7  This is significant for two 
reasons.  Firstly, because it was principally through the peaceful means of trade and cultural 
interaction that Islam spread to the Sahel and beyond.8  This deep Islamic past was not reflected 
in French conceptions of Islam in Africa, which, in turn, influenced how French authorities 
engaged with African Muslims.   
3 
 
 The long history of Islam in Sub-Saharan Africa is also important because it reminds us 
of the ancient economic, political, religious, and socio-cultural ties linking North and Sub-
Saharan Africa.  These ties are too often obscured in the scholarly literature, much of which still 
treats these deeply interconnected regions as utterly distinct and separate.9  This is despite what 
scholars like Baz Lecocq consider the socio-political similarities between North and, at the very 
least, Sahelian Africa.  In particular, Lecocq points to both regions being dominated by a large 
number of relatively small, semi-autonomous political entities with constantly shifting 
allegiances, and the interconnectivity that comes from a shared religion.10    
 This article engages with the need to discuss North and West Africa in more integrated, 
comparative terms by analysing the role Islam played in two anticolonial rebellions in the French 
empire during the First World War: the rebellion in Batna, Algeria and the Kaocen War in Niger.  
These rebellions make for a good comparative study for a number of reasons.  They are two of 
the most significant rebellions of Muslim people in the French empire during the First World 
War.  The Kaocen War represents the largest and longest armed anticolonial rebellion in 
Nigerien history, and the rebellion in Batna, Algeria was put down by the largest French-led 
force assembled against Muslim rebels during the war.  These two rebellions also represent two 
distinct types of colonial geographic spaces: relatively well-integrated regions that were 
submitted to conscription (Batna) and newly-conquered territoires militaires (northern Niger) 
which still operated with a large degree of independence.  These rebellions remain under-studied 
in both the First World War and regional historiographical literature; neither are usually 
considered places where First World War fighting took place.  As such, this article expands the 
study of the First World War beyond its traditional geographic boundaries and ultimately 
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provides an important example of how North and West African histories can fruitfully be 
discussed in a comparative manner. 
 This article will examine the role Islam played in these rebellions in three main senses.  
Firstly it looks at Islam’s power to inspire and justify rebellion; the dreaded Pan-Islamic Jihad.  
For better or worse, jihad has been a major focus of European scholarship on Islam since the late 
1800s.11  The largely ineffectual Ottoman declaration of jihad in 1914 has similarly been a 
centrepiece of First World War history. 12  Focusing on the failure of the Ottoman jihad to rally a 
vast Pan-Islamic response, however, has obscured the way Islam was more effectively 
instrumentalised in parts of the non-Ottoman Muslim world, which this article addresses.   
  Secondly, this article looks at Islam’s role in binding diverse groups together.  Whether 
Islam was mobilised to rally people to rebel or to collaborate it acted as an important medium of 
contact and exchange across North and West Africa.13  The different ways that Islam was called 
upon by rebel and collaborationist groups gives us insight into how religion can make the global 
local, and the local global.  This section builds upon, and extends the timeframe, of the work 
done by Julia Clancy-Smith on the pragmatism and flexibility of religious leaders and groups in 
the face of European colonialism.14     
 Lastly this article looks at how perceptions of Islam influenced the French response to 
and repression of the rebellions in Niger and Algeria.  European conceptions of an eternal 
struggle between ‘Christendom’ and ‘Islam’ were, of course, nothing new in the early 20th 
century.15  European fears of Islam were heightened in the early 20th century by a perceived 
volatility in the Muslim world following the revolution in Persia in 1906, the deposition of the 
Ottoman and Moroccan sultans in 1908, and the various conflicts the French and Italians had 
with the Senussi in the early 1900s.16  The entry of the Ottomans to the First World War further 
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ratcheted up these fears.  A potent mix of fear and vengeance translated into a sustained and 
brutal repression meted out by French imperial forces in the wake of the rebellions in Batna and 
Niger.  In these repressions Islam was at times a target, and at other times used as justification 
for collective discipline.  This repression remains seriously under-studied and is absent from 
broader First World War historiography.  Focusing on colonial violence and repression during 
the war makes for a contrast with the collaborationist framework that shapes most writing on 
colonial societies during the First World War.17   
 It is important to note that this article is in no way intended to offer any theological 
engagement with Islam, as such.  Islam represents an intensely diverse religious and cultural 
tradition.18  Islam was experienced, practiced, understood, and instrumentalised in many 
different ways, across many different aspects of life, by the African and European historical 
actors this article covers.  ‘Muslim’ in this period furthermore had a racialized connotation, 
drawn from European assumptions about, and misinterpretations of, ‘the Muslim world’.19  The 
racialisation of Islam was common among French colonial officials, and even had echoes in how 
some North and West African people saw themselves and their communities.20  Given the 
complexity and fluidity that ‘Islam’ or ‘Muslim’ connote, now and in the early 20th century, this 
article, as much as possible, allows for its historical actors to use and define Islam as they saw 
fit.  The principal focus here is not on ‘Islam’ itself, but rather on its many different historical 
expressions and usages. Before going any further it is also important to take a moment to discuss 
sources.  The vast majority of the sources extant for these rebellions are documents produced by 
the French colonial administration.  This, necessarily, creates difficulties in assessing the 
mentality and motivations of various rebel groups.  The situation is especially dire for Batna, 
Algeria where the original voices of the rebels are mostly lost.  Even court testimony gathered 
6 
 
during the repression, as imperfect a source as it is, scarcely houses any direct quotes from 
Algerian rebels.21  Where we do have direct quotes from Algerians they are filtered through 
French channels, and therefore need to be treated with a degree of caution. 
 For the Kaocen War things are much better.  A good quantity of original Senussi 
correspondence has survived and much of it is currently stored in the Archives Nationales de 
Sénégal.  Most of the correspondence exists only in translation (in French, English, or Italian, 
depending on the archive), but some of the original Arabic letters remain.  The Kaocen War also 
benefits from a good quantity of oral tradition, some of which was gathered by Boubou Hama in 
the 1960s and published in a series of source books called Documents Nigeriens.  These are held 
at the Université Abdou-Moumouni in Niamey.  In addition to this are traces of oral history 
gathered by historians like André Salifou, Kimba Idrissa and others from the early 1960s into the 
1980s that survive in their published books and articles.  These sources provide a rich, if not 
always congruous, body of material to help balance against French colonial interpretations that 
survive in abundance in the archives in Dakar and Niamey.   
 
I 
When writing or thinking about rebellion one cannot escape the first, and usually the dominant, 
question that springs to mind: why did the rebellion happen, or perhaps more precisely, why did 
it happen at that particular moment?  As historians, despite the countless books and articles 
written on rebellion in one form or another, we do not yet have any firm framework for assessing 
this very fundamental question.  This question, ‘Why, and why then?’, has been approached in 
different ways by historians of Algeria.  Algerian scholars have been more likely to refer to the 
rebels of Batna as mujahedeen or nationalist revolutionaries, seeing their rebellion as part of a 
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130-year-long struggle for independence.22  European works, especially more general ones, are 
more likely to take the same line as French colonial administrators; namely that the rebellion was 
overwhelmingly due to conscription and that any broader political motivation was either 
secondary or non-existent.23  The most notable example of this is Gilbert Meynier’s tome 
L’Algérie révélée: La guerre de 1914-1918 et le premier quart du XXe siècle which notes curtly 
that conscription ‘precipitated the insurrection in South Constantine’.24  Some recent work, like 
that of James McDougall, takes a more nuanced view and sees the rebellions as evidence of the 
enduring strength of local Algerian social systems and their semi-independence from French 
authority.25  Religion is barely mentioned in modern European works on the subject, which 
misses an important facet of the movements in both Algeria and Niger.   
 Contemporary French reports, enthralled in a belle époque obsession with the Classical 
world, liked to claim that the region around Batna had never really submitted to anyone: not the 
French, nor the Ottomans, nor even the Romans!26  This caricature of the perpetually rebellious 
denizens of north-eastern Algeria is found time and again in French documents.  Several reports 
cite a conversation between Bouzidi Mohammed Ben Taleb, a local marabout, and an unnamed 
French officer at the Pasteur outpost in which Bouzidi says of Aurèsians, ‘These people have 
rebellion in their blood.  They rebel, have rebelled, and will rebel.’27  Whether the conversation 
happened or not it bears witness to the frequent ability of people living in desert or mountain 
peripheries to maintain a state of at least semi-independence from centralized authorities.28 
 French reports surrounding the Batna rebellion were also rife with fears of Pan-Islamism, 
especially in the wake of the Ottoman Empire declaring a jihad against the Entente powers in 
1914.29  The Ottoman entry into the war made even more real the threat of possible German 
intervention, which French colonial administrators always feared lay behind anticolonial 
8 
 
resistance during the war.30  Entente strategists did not quite understand the context of the 
Ottoman Sultan calling forth his nominal religious power as Caliph; the Ottoman jihad was 
called as much for reasons of internal stability vis-à-vis ethnic Arabs as anything else.31  French 
colonial administrators tracked Pan-Islamic anticolonial pamphlets published in Cairo and 
Constantinople, and enacted strict censorship of personal correspondence and imported politico-
religious documents in West Africa.32  These efforts ultimately could not stop the importation of 
Pan-Islamic texts through Tunisia and Libya into Algeria as part of a broader ideological and 
intellectual current flowing through the western Muslim world, from Morocco to the Arabian 
Peninsula.33  
 On a more local level there were Rahmaniyya muqaddams, Sufi adepts, who held 
influence in the rebellion in Batna, but their power significantly blurred the lines between 
political, personal and religious influence.34  Religion obviously played a role in their influence, 
but was only ever one part of a larger base of power.   Popular references to Islam mostly came 
in the form of songs which drew on religious and historical themes, including the Crusades.,35  In 
his report on the Batna rebellion Octave Depont wrote about pro-German songs sung by Algerian 
‘troubadours’, which were often infused with religious subtext.36  In the most common form of 
these popular songs Kaiser Wilhelm is often referred to as ‘Hajj Guillaume’, a reference to the 
Kaiser’s supposed conversion to Islam and performance of the Hajj.37  This positioning of the 
Kaiser as not only a temporal protector of Islam, but in fact a devoted Muslim convert, was 
common across North and West Africa during the First World War.  Missives discovered in 
mosques in Nigeria and Cameroon, for example, claimed that if the Kaiser died ‘he dies a 
Muslim’.38   
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 The popular songs sung in Algeria during the First World War provide unique insight 
into the strong overlap between religious and secular geopolitical discourse.  Islam provides a 
shared language for communicating political goals (Algerian independence), and a framework 
tying distant geopolitical developments to more local issues.  In this sense these songs, and to 
some extent Islam in general, collapse global events to have local significance, and situate local 
conflicts in a broader, global context.  For songs claiming that Germany was on the cusp of 
invading Algeria and taking it from the French, an invasion inspired by Kaiser Wilhelm’s 
supposed Islamic faith, the political and the religious contexts are all but inextricable.   
 What is more, the First World War was not the first time that Algerians looked abroad, in 
particular towards the Ottoman Empire, for an external saviour who might liberate them from 
France.39  Religion is used to explain why an unlikely military or geopolitical event may come to 
pass, and also to justify Algerian allegiance to yet another external colonial power.  The 
supposed conversion of Kaiser Wilhelm explains why he might try to liberate Algeria, but 
undergirding this argument was the foundational belief in German military strength and prowess.  
We see this in the small number of direct quotations we have from Algerian deserters during the 
war.  In their interrogation they frequently cited the power of Germany, and their belief that 
Germany would eventually prevail, as laying behind their decision to desert.40   
 This matches similar claims made across the French empire by deserters and rebels who 
felt that France was notably weakened by the war, and that it was an opportune moment to risk 
rebellion, or at least disobedience.41  Particularly interesting here is how individual religiosity or 
calls upon religious language and ties were mobilised by the rebels at Batna, in the absence of 
support from formal Islamic leaders or institutions.42  This bottom-up foundation for the 
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movement helps explain the political moves the rebels make after their dramatic attacks in 
November 1916. 
 The Batna uprising climaxed with the capture and burning of the bordj at Mac-Mahon by 
Algerian rebels on 12 November 1916.  In French reports on the capture of Mac-Mahon the 
deaths of the administrator and sous-préfet loom large.43  Looking deeper into the targets of the 
rebels, however, is telling.  Firstly, before the bordj was attacked the rebels sacked a number of 
farms that belonged to Europeans.  These farms were not only the most explicit symbol of 
French people coming in and expropriating land for their own economic ends, but they were also 
a source of food, tools, and other valuable materials, all of which was sorely lacking and bitterly 
expensive by late 1916.44  In the attack on the bordj itself the rebels took especial time to burn 
the administrative archives, which, among other things, contained the records related to 
conscription and recruitment in and around Batna.45  The priority given to the destruction of 
these documents shows how important French bureaucracy, and especially recruitment, was as a 
motivator for the rebels.   
 Even more telling than the attention given to the destruction of administrative records at 
Mac-Mahon was the rebels’ decision to found a nominal Algerian republic on 12 November 
1916.46  After capturing Mac-Mahon in the early hours of 12 November the rebels could have 
done any number of things that did not entail setting up an independent republic.  The fact that 
they did so implies a long-term, agreed-upon plan to do so, which is striking.  What’s more, the 
rebels at Mac-Mahon were not alone; the Maghreb experienced a wave of republican sentiment 
during, and immediately after, the First World War.  Tunisians declared their own independent 
republic in 1918, Moroccans did the same in Rif in 1920, as did Egyptians in Zifta in 1919.47  
The secular force behind these movements is notable, especially in Egypt where nationalists 
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expressly pointed to the religious diversity of Egypt, rather than couching their effort in Islamic 
terms.  More broadly there were new nation-states and republics born out of anticolonial 
rebellion in the Arabian Peninsula (1916), Vietnam (1917), Ireland (1916) and elsewhere.48  Set 
within the context of the wave of republics borne during and immediately after the First World 
War, the rebels at Batna must be described as republicans rather than people motivated primarily 
by religion.  These distinctions are more blurry when dealing with the Senussi War, of which the 
Kaocen War was a part, due to the war being centred on a religious sect. 
 The best, and most recent, English-language account of the Kaocen War was written by 
Kimba Idrissa in 2003.  Idrissa draws two Islamic connections that must be addressed.  The first 
is the relationship between Kaocen and Abderrahmane Tegama ag Bagari, the Sultan of Agadez, 
with whom Kaocen had covertly planned the siege of Agadez.  Tegama, born in 1880, had 
undertaken Koranic studies in Agadez, Borno, and Kano before being converted to Senussism, 
giving him some foundation on which to base claims of spiritual authority.49  Tegama was 
appointed the Sultan of Agadez by French authorities in 1908, thus finding himself in a position 
of temporal power as a local client for the French empire.  It was this influence that allowed him 
to declare a religious war against the French, a decision that no doubt helped win the support of 
people in the Aïr who had for a long time been otherwise atomised.50  Oral history given by 
Elhadj Bougounou of Agadez, among others, confirms the central importance of Islam in 
Tegama’s ability to bring together competing factions in the Aïr to fight against the ‘kaffirs’, the 
French.51 
 The importance of religion to Kaocen personally, on the other hand, is difficult to pin 
down.  The oral tradition consistently highlights Kaocen’s martial prowess, but rarely puts this in 
a religious context.52  In the chronicle laid down by Mohamed Chouwa, ‘the Chadian’, Kaocen is 
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said to have won the favour of Sid Sidi Mohammed El-Abed, in important Senussi patron, 
through his military exploits, rather than any religious devotion.53  Other oral accounts highlight 
the religious underpinning of these martial exploits, noting that Kaocen won the respect and trust 
of El-Abed by ‘clearing the land of the infidels, and because they had fought with faith for the 
cause of Islam’.54  This affinity led El-Abed, after the successes against the Italians in Libya and 
the French at Djanet, Algeria, to supply Kaocen with a large quantity of men and arms to push 
the French out of Niger.  The relationships and geographic space that formed the partnership 
between El-Abed and Kaocen remind us of the fluidity of ‘Saharan’, North, and West African 
histories.55 
 Oral history communicated by Ammane ben Ahmed Bougounou in the 1960s when he 
was the Marabout of Agadez, focuses primarily on Kaocen’s ‘manly’ attributes, rather than his 
religious devotion.  Young Kaocen is described as wandering the mountains and valleys of Aïr 
alone, single-handedly raiding Arab caravans as a young boy and ‘never returning to camp 
without booty’ whilst on raid.56  Kaocen is depicted as being sparked into action against the 
French primarily by in-fighting amongst the Tuareg, rather than by any sort of religious 
awakening (the fact that Kaocen finds himself fighting against the Italians in 1911-2 and the 
French multiple times from 1909 to 1919 may support claims that he fought primarily to 
preserve Tuareg independence).  Given that these chronicles were kept by marabouts, who would 
undoubtedly seek to highlight the faith and devotion of Muslim heroes, the fact that Kaocen’s 
religious ardour is rarely mentioned suggests either that religion was not his principal driving 
motivation, or that the marabouts do not want to be too closely associated with a historical figure 
that, while often cast in heroic light, also precipitated probably the worst period of colonial 
repression in Nigerien history. 
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 Kaocen and Tegama’s religiosity is even more difficult to pin down in their surviving 
papers. In their wide-ranging correspondence with Tuareg, Toubou, and Senussi leaders across 
the eastern Sahara Kaocen and Tegama do reference theology, the Prophet and jihad; but it is 
unclear if these where rhetorical devices or heartfelt calls for religious unity.  The importance of 
Islam and religious language in formal correspondence in the region was certainly substantial.  
French correspondence with Senussi leaders before hostilities erupted between them is 
overflowing with deeply religious language.57  Kaocen does reference Islam and fighting against 
the infidel in his decrees and letters, at least in part as a means to guilt other groups into 
supporting his war effort.58  Tegama’s role as a spiritual leader was much more prominent, but 
Finn Fuglestad has argued that it was nevertheless nominal and symbolic; it did not necessarily 
denote a strong religious devotion and Fuglestad argued that it garnered little respect or power 
among the Tuareg.59 
 While religious fervour may not have been the preeminent motivator for the Kaocen War 
it is worth taking a step back and looking at the role that Islam played in the broader context in 
which the war began. The Kaocen war, on one level, was a component part of the broader 
Senussi War, which raged from late 1914 until the early 1920s.60  The Senussi War itself is not a 
monolith, but rather a loose series of relationships between Senussi groups, or groups led by 
Senussi leaders, who fought against the Italians in Libya, the British in Egypt and Sudan, and the 
French in Tunisia, Chad, Algeria and Niger.  Religion was naturally mobilised by the Senussi to 
hold their diverse coalition together (a coalition which included Ottoman agents), but this had its 
limits and did not afford the Senussi a position from which to dictate to populations in Libya, let 
alone in Chad, Sudan, Algeria, and Niger.61  In this sense the Senussi jihad shares similarities to 
its better-known Ottoman counterpart.62  At the same time we should recognise the importance 
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of religion to the wider Senussi movement, which in some ways resembles the great state-
building jihads of the 19th century.63  These movements forcefully remind us that religiosity and 
state-building are in no way mutually exclusive.  While the very loose organisation was based 
heavily on a shared religious ideology there are strong arguments that religion played a variable 
role in the individual participants in the Senussi War.  This is especially true of the branch of the 
Senussi headed by Sid Sidi Mohammed El-Abed in Fezzan, the Senussi who supplied Kaocen 
with the bulk of his initial arms and men.   
 El-Abed, according to the excellent recent work by Simona Berhe, was interested 
overwhelmingly in his own independent political power, and not in the Pan-Islamic ideals and 
goals of his older brother, the Grand Senussi.64  This differing take on the importance of Islam 
led the Grand Senussi to ally more closely with the Ottomans, which led the Senussi in 
Cyrenaica to launch an utterly doomed invasion of Egypt in 1916.65  All this while El-Abed and 
his associates in Fezzan (including Kaocen’s brother Mokhtar) shook their heads at the folly of it 
all.  If Kaocen was a real jihadist interested in promoting the cause of Pan-Islamic revolt and a 
unification of African Muslims under the black banner of the Senussi he had his opportunity, and 
instead allied himself with the far more pragmatic and calculating El-Abed. 
 
II 
If Islam was not the primary motivation for Kaocen or his closest associates this is not to say that 
it was not important, or that it did not serve any useful function.  Islam is unavoidable in the 
correspondence circulated around the broader Senussi leaders and is a testament to how 
important it was culturally.  Here is just one example, of many, of an excerpt from a typical letter 
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between Senussi leaders (in this instance between El-Abed and Moussa Ag Amastane, from May 
1917).   
In the name of God the clement and merciful.  From the part of the slave to his 
Master, Mohammed Labed ben sid Mohammed Sherif Essenoussi, Elkhettabi, 
Elhassani, Elidrissi, to the most grand, powerful, precious, [and] glorious, to our 
friend, to the one who delights our eyes, the Tobel Moussa, Amenokal [military 
leader] of the Hoggar.  God protect you.  May salvation be upon you, as well as 
the mercy of God the highest and his blessings….We praise God for granting you 
health and peace.66 
 
  
Almost the entire bulk of the letter proper is full of religious haranguing, with the practical 
components of the letter only coming at the very end (namely, El-Abed disavowing Kaocen and 
claiming, farcically, that Kaocen had acted entirely without his help or knowledge).  There is no 
doubt that Islam provided some sense of a shared cultural and spiritual identity for the various 
Senussi factions.  It was a binding agent, related to, and spread by, commerce, that maintained 
relationships spread out over vast distances, and often amongst groups and individuals with 
divergent, and at times diametrically opposed, political objectives.67  The fact that the Senussi 
War fractured irreparably as soon as the Grand Senussi’s invasion of Egypt failed shows both the 
power, and the fragility, of relying on religion.68   
 Oral history sees Kaocen frequently turning to religion to bolster his coalition or 
admonish his enemies.  In the account of Malam Douhary Tanode from Agadez, Kaocen is 
remarked as having written to the French ordering them to give up Christianity or perish:  ‘Dear 
Captain, I am writing to you to say, in your own interest, abandon Christianity and idolatry.  If 
not, grave things will pass between us.’69  Given the fact that Kaocen’s army achieved near-total 
surprise when it suddenly appeared at the gates of Agadez, and the fact that the French have no 
records of direct correspondence with Kaocen, this exchange is almost certainly apocryphal.  
More convincingly some oral history points to Islam as a key force in unifying Kaocen and 
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Tegama with both men agreeing to a ‘war on the kaffirs’, even if Idrissa suggests this was 
perhaps a somewhat cynical mobilisation of religion to win supporters by Kaocen and Tegama.70 
 Tanode’s account goes on to stress the largely secular nature of the planning and relations 
between Kaocen and Tegama, amongst Tegama and his advisors, and between both men and 
other Tuareg groups, including the Hoggar.71  The role of religion in mediating the relations 
between different Tuareg groups is especially interesting.  In one letter from Ahmoud, the Sultan 
of Ghat to Kaocen from March 1918 Ahmoud, after warmly greeting Kaocen (‘Praise be to the 
one god.  It is to him that we implore for relief.  To our friend and brother, the venerated Kaocen 
ben Mohammed, may god protect you’), goes on to denounce the ‘vile usurpers of Islam’, the 
Hoggar, a Tuareg group from Algeria who had ultimately sided with the French in the broader 
Senussi War.72  The division of Muslims into true believers and heretics of course has a long and 
important history in the high politics of the Sahel and Sahara; in particular these divisions, 
usually invented, served as casus belli for the state-building jihads of Usman Dan Fodio a 
century earlier.73  That said, these divisions still undermine claims that the Tuareg and Senussi 
were united in Pan-Islamic struggle.  Can a movement truly be Pan-Islamic if Muslims fight 
against it?  At the same time, some oral tradition places Islam at the centre of the motivation for 
most participants in the fighting, showing the power Islam might have as a binding agent for 
followers even if it is deployed somewhat cynically by faction leaders.74  
 If Islam provided a cultural basis for mutual understanding among Tuareg leaders in 
Libya, Algeria and Niger it seemed to play no such role in Batna.  Whereas French 
administrators were fearful of instrumentalised Islam in West Africa from 1914 French reports 
surrounding local religious leaders around Batna are effusive in describing the loyalty of 
religious figures in the conscription effort.75  This is a common theme in war-time French 
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documents, with surveillance reports very rarely mentioning any religious personages as being 
even suspect of disloyalty.76    While it is true that French reports often lament that some 
marabouts did not go out of their way to warn the French of the impending attacks at Mac-
Mahon and elsewhere this does not necessarily mean that the marabouts acted out of any 
disloyalty to France or along religious lines.77  Collaborationist leaders need to be able to tack a 
middle ground and appease both French colonialists and the local indigenous population; this is 
rarely an easy task. 
 While the vast majority of religious figures sided, overtly or tacitly, with the French there 
were some rebels who drew power and influence from religion.  Of these the most prominent 
was the sheikh of Seggana.  As a sheikh he operated with the tacit approval of the French, not 
entirely unlike Tegama in Agadez, but relied primarily on pre-existing power structures, some of 
which were religious.78  He was noted not only for his wealth, but also for his religiosity, and his 
having taken multiple pilgrimages to Mecca.79  Unfortunately, whatever specific exhortations he 
made to his followers have since been lost, but at least some of the rebels at Batna did see 
themselves as taking part in wider events that had some rooting in religion.  Octave Depont 
quoted, accurately or not, Algerians saying things like ‘[our sons will not go and] die in 
conditions contrary to the Muslim religion’.80  Both French and Algerian actors noted that the 
rebels’ ‘co-religionists’ were rebelling across Northern Africa, although the movements largely 
remained separate from one another and tended to follow nationalist, rather than pan-Islamic 
lines.81   
 While religious language and exhortations would have been a part of the glue that held 
the Algerian rebel movement together the core structures and goals of the Batna rebellion were 
overwhelmingly practical and political.82  The rebellion was a calculated political move that had 
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been meditated for months, at least.83  The French suspicion that the rebellion had been pre-
planned of course undercuts their assertions that the rebellion was exclusively about 
conscription, a common rhetoric used to deflect critiques of the French imperial project and its 
consequences.  For many French military and colonial authorities it was much easier to frame the 
rebellions in Algeria and Niger as being fuelled by extremely proximate (and therefore short-
lived) stresses like recruitment, and exacerbated by what they often saw as religious fanaticism. 
 
III 
To understand the full role of Islam in the rebellions in Algeria and Niger in the First World War 
one must look at the effect that an imagined Islam had on French administrators and officers 
operating in Africa.  Islam held an odd, and at times contradictory, place in the imagination of 
French colonial officers and administrators who often found themselves treading a careful 
ideological and political line on the subject. 84  On the one hand, a surprising number of French 
officers and administrators had positive things to say about the religion85, even if only within the 
context of their more virulent disdain and condescension for black Africans and polytheistic 
religious beliefs (‘fetishism’ in contemporary French parlance).86  Parallels to these fraught 
imaginations of Islam in European thought are of course nothing new, and persist in different 
forms today. 
 Whether their individual opinions of Islam tended to the more or less favourable ends of 
the spectrum, most French administrators maintained a deep-seated fear of the illusory Pan-
Islamic uprising that would unite the diverse populations of North and West Africa against them 
(populations the French had actively sought to fragment and supplant through their politique des 
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races).87  The middling path often taken by French authorities was perhaps best summed up in a 
report from May 1914: 
To persecute Islam would be still more dangerous: it would be to unavoidably 
provoke not a direct revolt; Muslims are too intelligent for that.  [Rather, it would 
exacerbate] the natural state of mind of the population of all races worried about 
their faith, the thirst of persecution, the exasperation of faith, and [incite] a more 
acute proselytism.88 
   
In short, persecuting Islam would not make the French safer, but would only further advance the 
prerequisite conditions that would make the all-dreaded pan-Islamic uprising all the more likely.  
Despite trying to not quite encourage the spread of Islam (despite building médersas and 
sponsoring loyal Muslims’ pilgrimages to Mecca) nor discourage it (despite periodically 
persecuting Muslim leaders and maintaining a tight control on incoming Islamic literature in 
Dakar) the French presence ultimately hastened the spread of Islam as greater regional 
connectivity, spurred by the French desire to easily maintain liaison between far-flung outposts 
and facilitate European economic activity in West Africa.89 
 One end of the broad spectrum of beliefs held by the French on the question of Islam can 
be represented by individuals like Octave Depont.  In 1916 Octave Depont, then Inspector-
General of the Communes Mixtes of Algeria, was tasked with writing a report which sought to 
explain why and how a serious rebellion had erupted in Batna earlier that year (this after Depont 
had already published a lengthy, if unreliable and condescending, report on Islam in Africa).90  
To his credit, Depont often saw rebellion as coming from a very broad range of stressors, 
primarily economic (the arrival of locusts, for example) and political, even if his analysis overtly 
failed to assign any blame whatsoever to the faults of French administration or governance.91  
Principal among these causes, for Depont, was anger over French attempts to recruit Algerians to 
serve in the French army and to fight in the bloody killing fields of Europe and the Middle East.  
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In addition to this practical concern, however, Depont recognised another, more insidious threat: 
Pan-Islamic jihad.   
 For Depont the Ottoman declaration of holy war constituted a ‘very oriental duplicity’ in 
only targeting Muslims living in the empires of France, Britain and Russia, but that ‘the poison 
of holy war…did not, in general, have effects that were too serious.’92  This does not mean that 
Depont felt that Islam had little role to play in the rebellion; far from it.  He repeatedly mentions 
the nefarious workings of marabouts, of indigenous chiefs who, feeling that the French were 
weak chose to place themselves ‘on the side of Allah’, and other similar statements.93  For 
Depont, and others like him, Islam represented a persistent and mysterious threat to French 
dominance in North and West Africa.  This sentiment may have informed French behaviour 
during the repression in Batna in 1917.  
 The repression meted out against Algerians living in and around Batna was felt wide and 
deep.  French authorities targeted not only the rebels and deserters themselves, but their families 
and their communities more broadly.  Hundreds were killed by roving French-led columns, 
largely made up of ‘Senegalese’ (West African) troops.94  By 1917 the forces of repression 
would balloon to some 13,892 men and 217 officers.95  805 Algerians were arrested, tried and 
condemned in the wake of rebellion.  To these are added roughly 400 more that were seemingly 
tried by local disciplinary commissions, and thus never had proper trials to begin with.  Depont 
justifies this level of violence ex post facto in his report stating, among other things, that: 
 
We have too often forgotten that in indigene lands, especially in times of war, an 
authority is not real, active, strong and obeyed, as it should be, but that it escapes 
the critiques of which the Muslims cannot not conceive neither the sense, nor the 
finesse, nor the reach and who always finish, in their spirit, by weakening power 






The methods of peace, with their formality, their hesitations and their scruples 
over legality, that we always end, before taking them up, by paying too much, 
have given up their place for the methods of war, the only ones applicable in 
many territories, as they combine at one the initiative, promptness of decision-
making and speed of execution, all necessary qualities, indispensable even, to 
better administrate indigenes and avoid, in troubled times, the insurrectional 
movements which have long menaced us.  It was these same methods of war that 
we followed in Batna, where the actions were graver than those related above, and 
where it was important to not allow things to degenerate into an insurrection.97 
 
 Livestock, probably the most important vehicle for storing wealth for most people in the region, 
were heavily targeted.  Ouanassa Tngour estimates that Aurès lost around 165 cows, 2,563 sheep 
and 1,238 goats plus about 58,428 francs (a mixture of both cash and stolen goods).98  To this 
was added a series of collective fines and punishments which grew the overall cost to some 
726,835 francs, a staggering sum for the already impoverished residents of Aurès.99  Using 
rebellion to justify a wholesale theft of Algerian wealth was an established tactic of French 
colonial authorities by 1917.  It had already been used after the rebellion in 1871, after which 
substantial sums of money and tracts of land were expropriated by French officials under the 
cover of collective punishment.100 
 To justify wide-ranging collective discipline the Governor-General’s office produced an 
extensive document building a legal justification for levying fines on people not implicated in the 
rebellion to cost the cost of damage done to French administrative buildings and also to French-
owned farms.101  Part of the justification included ‘the traditions of Islam’, which the author 
claimed had a legal tradition of collective punishment.  Thus, while Islam was not at the absolute 
forefront of French justifications for their broad-based repression of Aurès in 1917 it formed a 
notable part of the justification for both the military and civil force levied against innocent 
Aurèsians in the wake of the rebellion of 1916.  
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 Similarly, in Niger the fear of Islam, and the French sense of being betrayed at a 
vulnerable time of war, led to absolutely brutal repression.  Multiple accounts note that the 
French massacred Muslims upon lifting the siege at Agadez; with massacres occurring at several 
other junctures during the repression of 1917-1919.102  André Salifou’s Kaoussan ou la Révolte 
Sénoussiste is especially detailed here, thanks to oral history that Salifou gathered in the 1960s 
with survivors of the French repression.  Akililik Ag Tabia of the Igamayan Tuareg recalled how  
 
I was accused of having participated in the revolt.  A White by the name of 
Bourges condemned us to death at In Gall and grouped us up about twenty steps 
from the current Administrative Post.  A Kel Fadey Tuareg, Bacha, asked 
Bourges for mercy for all the young people of my age [which was granted].  
Then, in my presence, Bourges gave the order to the soldiers to start the execution 
by bayonet and by coupe-coupe [machete].  My uncles and cousins fell before me, 
bayonets thrust in their back, and their heads [chopped nearly off] were left 
dangling on their breast or their back, held in place [only] by a flap of skin.103 
 
Stories of French massacres are also found in the oral tradition.  The chronicle of Ammane ben 
Ahmed Bougounou, Marabout of Agadez, in particular notes the massacre of Muslims, 
especially preachers or wise men, in the aftermath of the siege at Agadez.104  Looking on from 
Nigeria and Egypt even the British were horrified at the French behaviour.  Frederick Lugard, 
British Governor General of Nigeria, noted that French activities ‘appeared to be little short of 
extermination’.105  Lugard had feared ahead of time that the coming French repression would be 
unusually brutal, and was unenthusiastic about assisting the French in southern Niger.106  British 
troops based in Nigeria had occupied posts in southern Niger to free up French garrisons to take 
part in the Kaocen war, placing them in a position to discover and transmit information regarding 
the French repression.  Their limited deployment, however, and the fact that they began 
withdrawing as early as April 1917, limits the scope of their intelligence, especially since the war 
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dragged on for a further two years.107  Nevertheless, Lugard’s perception of French activities in 
the Senussi Wars was confirmed by post-war British reports, which benefitted from insights 
derived from British officials in Egypt.  One report, admittedly focusing on Tripolitania and 
Fezzan rather than Niger, suggests that the population of these regions fell from 650,000 to 
250,000 (61.5%) during the height of the Senussi Wars and subsequent repression, from 1916-
1919.108  It is not hard to imagine that the Aïr shared a similarly gruesome fate. 
 The scale of the horror inflicted by the French repression in Niger is hard to measure, but 
some historians have suggested that the population of Aïr fell by roughly half during the period 
of the French repression (primarily from 1917-1919).109  Such an arithmetic is, however, 
extremely hard to verify, even in the best of circumstances.  Population figures, even for the 
better-documented southern region of Niger, are suspect, and even if they were soundly accurate 
it would not be easy to distinguish between the population losses due to migration, famine-
related death and disease, and people who were killed outright by French-led troops.110  Simply 
put, the exact death toll of the French repression is unknown, and probably unknowable.  The 
massacres that took place at Agadez, In Gall, and elsewhere are nowhere to be found in the 
official correspondence between Mourin, commander of the Column of Agadez, and his 
superiors. This is, of course, unsurprising.   
 The ferocity of the French repression, while hardly out of line with other colonial 
repressions, must at least in part come back to French fears about an imagined Islam.  The direct 
association of Kaocen with a specific Islamic sect (the Senussi) that was waging war against 
Europeans across a wide span of the eastern Sahara was undoubtedly enough to convince French 
officers that Islam was, at least in part, to blame.  This also helps explain why the killing of 





Religion, in its many forms, has always played a central role in the lives of people and their 
societies.  For the rebels in Batna and Niger, Islam offered a larger vision of community and 
history.  In a rhetorical sense it tied together their local struggles with the grand struggles of 
Muslim people all over the world during the First World War.  This rhetoric did in some way 
translate into reality for rebels from Morocco to Niger who received small quantities of military 
supplies from the Germans and Ottomans at different times during their rebellions.111  Islam 
could, even if only briefly, paper over long-standing divisions to bring people together for the 
pursuance of a singular, united goal: in this instance, the establishment of new, independent 
states free from European control.  This should caution us against seeing ‘all religion [a]s 
premodern and antirational while the state is both modern and rational’.112 
 Islam provided a shared language that communicated a sense of identity and community 
among disparate groups, be they the Tuareg factions scattered across the Sahara, or the rebels, 
patriots and intellectuals producing revolutionary or Pan-Islamic pamphlets that found their way 
into the hands of people living in north-eastern Algeria.  Islam was used as a rhetorical device 
before and after the rebellions of 1916 to highlight the most immediately obvious difference 
between Algerians and Nigeriens and their French colonizers.113  It could, in a word, stand in for 
opposition to the French politico-economic programmes in North and West Africa that 
undermined pre-existing social structures and expropriated huge tracts of land for European 
development and exploitation.   
 For the French, Islam presented both a spectre to be feared and repressed, and also 
justification for their policy of brutal collective discipline.114  European relationships with Islam 
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across Africa in the late 1800s and early 1900s had been nuanced and fluid, moving between 
persecution, surveillance, and facilitation based on changing circumstances and changing 
colonial leadership.115  The strain of war and ramped-up fears regarding Islamic ‘fanaticism’ saw 
the French pursue brutal repression in Algeria and Niger from 1917.  This repression was 
targeted at Muslims in Niger, and justified by thin appeals to French misperceptions of Islamic 
law in Algeria.  This should cause us to reconsider how common violent repression was in 
European empires during the First World War.  The colonial recruitment campaigns, especially 
that of the French empire, were often based explicitly on coercion; in West Africa they were 
even modelled on the old Trans-Atlantic slave trade.116  These recruitment practices helped spur 
anticolonial rebellions from Senegal to Saigon.  The brutal repression that followed most of the 
rebellions has not yet been integrated into the broader historiography of European empire during 
the First World War, which has tended to engage with colonial populations only after they are 
successfully recruited into European militaries.  At the very least the experiences of Batna, 
Algeria and the Aïr in Niger prompt us to reconsider the breadth to imperial-colonial experiences 
and repercussions stemming from the realities of the First World War. 
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